Paul Simon
2009-02-15 16:43:37 UTC
Are Obama's Own Generals Plotting to Undermine His Exit Strategy for
Iraq?
By Gareth Porter, IPS News. Posted February 7, 2009.
A network of senior military officers appears to be engaged in an
effort to mobilize public opinion against Obama's decision to leave
Iraq.
CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus, supported by Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, tried to convince President Barack Obama that he had to
back down from his campaign pledge to withdraw all U.S. combat troops
from Iraq within 16 months at an Oval Office meeting Jan. 21.
But Obama informed Gates, Petraeus, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm.
Mike Mullen that he wasn't convinced and that he wanted Gates and the
military leaders to come back quickly with a detailed 16-month plan,
according to two sources who have talked with participants in the
meeting.
Obama's decision to override Petraeus' recommendation has not ended
the conflict between the president and senior military officers over
troop withdrawal, however. There are indications that Petraeus and his
allies in the military and the Pentagon, including Gen. Ray Odierno,
now the top commander in Iraq, have already begun to try to pressure
Obama to change his withdrawal policy.
A network of senior military officers is also reported to be preparing
to support Petraeus and Odierno by mobilizing public opinion against
Obama's decision.
Petraeus was visibly unhappy when he left the Oval Office, according
to one of the sources. A White House staffer present at the meeting
was quoted by the source as saying, "Petraeus made the mistake of
thinking he was still dealing with George Bush instead of with Barack
Obama."
Petraeus, Gates, and Odierno had hoped to sell Obama on a plan that
they formulated in the final months of the Bush administration that
aimed at getting around a key provision of the U.S.-Iraqi withdrawal
agreement signed envisioned re-categorizing large numbers of combat
troops as support troops. That subterfuge was by the United States
last November while ostensibly allowing Obama to deliver on his
campaign promise.
Gates and Mullen had discussed the relabeling scheme with Obama as
part of the Petraeus-Odierno plan for withdrawal they had presented to
him in mid-December, according to a Dec. 18 New York Times story.
Obama decided against making any public reference to his order to the
military to draft a detailed 16-month combat troop withdrawal policy,
apparently so that he can announce his decision only after consulting
with his field commanders and the Pentagon.
The first clear indication of the intention of Petraeus, Odierno, and
their allies to try to get Obama to amend his decision came on Jan. 29
when the New York Times published an interview with Odierno,
ostensibly based on the premise that Obama had indicated that he was
"open to alternatives."
The Times reported that Odierno had "developed a plan that would move
slower than Mr. Obama's campaign timetable" and had suggested in an
interview "it might take the rest of the year to determine exactly
when United States forces could be drawn down significantly."
The opening argument by the Petraeus-Odierno faction against Obama's
withdrawal policy was revealed the evening of the Jan. 21 meeting when
retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, one of the authors of the Bush troop
surge policy and a close political ally and mentor of Gen. Petraeus,
appeared on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer to comment on Obama's pledge
on Iraq combat troop withdrawal.
Keane, who had certainly been briefed by Petraeus on the outcome of
the Oval Office meeting, argued that implementing such a withdrawal of
combat troops would "increase the risk rather dramatically over the 16
months." He asserted that it would jeopardize the "stable political
situation in Iraq" and called that risk "not acceptable."
The assertion that Obama's withdrawal policy threatens the gains
allegedly won by the Bush surge and Petraeus' strategy in Iraq will
apparently be the theme of the campaign that military opponents are
now planning.
Keane, the Army vice-chief of staff from 1999 to 2003, has ties to a
network of active and retired four-star Army generals, and since
Obama's Jan. 21 order on the 16-month withdrawal plan, some of the
retired four-star generals in that network have begun discussing a
campaign to blame Obama's troop withdrawal from Iraq for the ultimate
collapse of the political "stability" that they expect to follow U.S.
withdrawal, according to a military source familiar with the network's
plans.
The source says the network, which includes senior active duty
officers in the Pentagon, will begin making the argument to
journalists covering the Pentagon that Obama's withdrawal policy risks
an eventual collapse in Iraq. That would raise the political cost to
Obama of sticking to his withdrawal policy.
If Obama does not change the policy, according to the source, they
hope to have planted the seeds of a future political narrative blaming
his withdrawal policy for the "collapse" they expect in an Iraq
without U.S. troops.
That line seems likely to appeal to reporters covering the Iraq troop
withdrawal issue. Ever since Obama's inauguration, media coverage of
the issue has treated Obama' s 16-month withdrawal proposal as a
concession to antiwar sentiment which will have to be adjusted to the
"realities" as defined by the advice to Obama from Gates, Petraeus,
and Odierno.
Ever since he began working on the troop surge, Keane has been the
central figure manipulating policy in order to keep as many U.S.
troops in Iraq as possible. It was Keane who got Vice President Dick
Cheney to push for Petraeus as top commander in Iraq in late 2006 when
the existing commander, Gen. George W. Casey, did not support the
troop surge.
It was Keane who protected Petraeus' interests in ensuring the maximum
number of troops in Iraq against the efforts by other military leaders
to accelerate troop withdrawal in 2007 and 2008. As Bob Woodward
reported in The War Within, Keane persuaded President George W. Bush
to override the concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the stress
of prolonged U.S. occupation of Iraq on the U.S. Army and Marine Corps
as well its impact on the worsening situation in Afghanistan.
Bush agreed in September 2007 to guarantee that Petraeus would have as
many troops as he needed for as long as wanted, according to
Woodward's account.
Keane had also prevailed on Gates in April 2008 to make Petraeus the
new commander of CENTCOM. Keane argued that keeping Petraeus in the
field was the best insurance against a Democratic administration
reversing the Bush policy toward Iraq.
Keane had operated on the assumption that a Democratic president would
probably not take the political risk of rejecting Petraeus'
recommendation on the pace of troop withdrawal from Iraq. Woodward
quotes Keane as telling Gates, "Let's assume we have a Democratic
administration and they want to pull this thing out quickly, and now
they have to deal with General Petraeus and General Odierno. There
will be a price to be paid to override them."
Obama told Petraeus in Baghdad last July that, if elected, he would
regard the overall health of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps and the
situation in Afghanistan as more important than Petraeus' obvious
interest in maximizing U.S. troop strength in Iraq, according to Time
magazine's Joe Klein.
But judging from Petraeus' shock at Obama's Jan. 21 decision, he had
not taken Obama's previous rejection of his arguments seriously. That
miscalculation suggests that Petraeus had begun to accept Keane's
assertion that a newly elected Democratic president would not dare to
override his policy recommendation on troops in Iraq.
Iraq?
By Gareth Porter, IPS News. Posted February 7, 2009.
A network of senior military officers appears to be engaged in an
effort to mobilize public opinion against Obama's decision to leave
Iraq.
CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus, supported by Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, tried to convince President Barack Obama that he had to
back down from his campaign pledge to withdraw all U.S. combat troops
from Iraq within 16 months at an Oval Office meeting Jan. 21.
But Obama informed Gates, Petraeus, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm.
Mike Mullen that he wasn't convinced and that he wanted Gates and the
military leaders to come back quickly with a detailed 16-month plan,
according to two sources who have talked with participants in the
meeting.
Obama's decision to override Petraeus' recommendation has not ended
the conflict between the president and senior military officers over
troop withdrawal, however. There are indications that Petraeus and his
allies in the military and the Pentagon, including Gen. Ray Odierno,
now the top commander in Iraq, have already begun to try to pressure
Obama to change his withdrawal policy.
A network of senior military officers is also reported to be preparing
to support Petraeus and Odierno by mobilizing public opinion against
Obama's decision.
Petraeus was visibly unhappy when he left the Oval Office, according
to one of the sources. A White House staffer present at the meeting
was quoted by the source as saying, "Petraeus made the mistake of
thinking he was still dealing with George Bush instead of with Barack
Obama."
Petraeus, Gates, and Odierno had hoped to sell Obama on a plan that
they formulated in the final months of the Bush administration that
aimed at getting around a key provision of the U.S.-Iraqi withdrawal
agreement signed envisioned re-categorizing large numbers of combat
troops as support troops. That subterfuge was by the United States
last November while ostensibly allowing Obama to deliver on his
campaign promise.
Gates and Mullen had discussed the relabeling scheme with Obama as
part of the Petraeus-Odierno plan for withdrawal they had presented to
him in mid-December, according to a Dec. 18 New York Times story.
Obama decided against making any public reference to his order to the
military to draft a detailed 16-month combat troop withdrawal policy,
apparently so that he can announce his decision only after consulting
with his field commanders and the Pentagon.
The first clear indication of the intention of Petraeus, Odierno, and
their allies to try to get Obama to amend his decision came on Jan. 29
when the New York Times published an interview with Odierno,
ostensibly based on the premise that Obama had indicated that he was
"open to alternatives."
The Times reported that Odierno had "developed a plan that would move
slower than Mr. Obama's campaign timetable" and had suggested in an
interview "it might take the rest of the year to determine exactly
when United States forces could be drawn down significantly."
The opening argument by the Petraeus-Odierno faction against Obama's
withdrawal policy was revealed the evening of the Jan. 21 meeting when
retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, one of the authors of the Bush troop
surge policy and a close political ally and mentor of Gen. Petraeus,
appeared on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer to comment on Obama's pledge
on Iraq combat troop withdrawal.
Keane, who had certainly been briefed by Petraeus on the outcome of
the Oval Office meeting, argued that implementing such a withdrawal of
combat troops would "increase the risk rather dramatically over the 16
months." He asserted that it would jeopardize the "stable political
situation in Iraq" and called that risk "not acceptable."
The assertion that Obama's withdrawal policy threatens the gains
allegedly won by the Bush surge and Petraeus' strategy in Iraq will
apparently be the theme of the campaign that military opponents are
now planning.
Keane, the Army vice-chief of staff from 1999 to 2003, has ties to a
network of active and retired four-star Army generals, and since
Obama's Jan. 21 order on the 16-month withdrawal plan, some of the
retired four-star generals in that network have begun discussing a
campaign to blame Obama's troop withdrawal from Iraq for the ultimate
collapse of the political "stability" that they expect to follow U.S.
withdrawal, according to a military source familiar with the network's
plans.
The source says the network, which includes senior active duty
officers in the Pentagon, will begin making the argument to
journalists covering the Pentagon that Obama's withdrawal policy risks
an eventual collapse in Iraq. That would raise the political cost to
Obama of sticking to his withdrawal policy.
If Obama does not change the policy, according to the source, they
hope to have planted the seeds of a future political narrative blaming
his withdrawal policy for the "collapse" they expect in an Iraq
without U.S. troops.
That line seems likely to appeal to reporters covering the Iraq troop
withdrawal issue. Ever since Obama's inauguration, media coverage of
the issue has treated Obama' s 16-month withdrawal proposal as a
concession to antiwar sentiment which will have to be adjusted to the
"realities" as defined by the advice to Obama from Gates, Petraeus,
and Odierno.
Ever since he began working on the troop surge, Keane has been the
central figure manipulating policy in order to keep as many U.S.
troops in Iraq as possible. It was Keane who got Vice President Dick
Cheney to push for Petraeus as top commander in Iraq in late 2006 when
the existing commander, Gen. George W. Casey, did not support the
troop surge.
It was Keane who protected Petraeus' interests in ensuring the maximum
number of troops in Iraq against the efforts by other military leaders
to accelerate troop withdrawal in 2007 and 2008. As Bob Woodward
reported in The War Within, Keane persuaded President George W. Bush
to override the concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the stress
of prolonged U.S. occupation of Iraq on the U.S. Army and Marine Corps
as well its impact on the worsening situation in Afghanistan.
Bush agreed in September 2007 to guarantee that Petraeus would have as
many troops as he needed for as long as wanted, according to
Woodward's account.
Keane had also prevailed on Gates in April 2008 to make Petraeus the
new commander of CENTCOM. Keane argued that keeping Petraeus in the
field was the best insurance against a Democratic administration
reversing the Bush policy toward Iraq.
Keane had operated on the assumption that a Democratic president would
probably not take the political risk of rejecting Petraeus'
recommendation on the pace of troop withdrawal from Iraq. Woodward
quotes Keane as telling Gates, "Let's assume we have a Democratic
administration and they want to pull this thing out quickly, and now
they have to deal with General Petraeus and General Odierno. There
will be a price to be paid to override them."
Obama told Petraeus in Baghdad last July that, if elected, he would
regard the overall health of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps and the
situation in Afghanistan as more important than Petraeus' obvious
interest in maximizing U.S. troop strength in Iraq, according to Time
magazine's Joe Klein.
But judging from Petraeus' shock at Obama's Jan. 21 decision, he had
not taken Obama's previous rejection of his arguments seriously. That
miscalculation suggests that Petraeus had begun to accept Keane's
assertion that a newly elected Democratic president would not dare to
override his policy recommendation on troops in Iraq.